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Abstract: The measurement range problem, where one cannot determine the data outside the
range of the detector, limits the characterization of entanglement in high-dimensional quantum
systems when employing, among other tools from information theory, the entropic uncertainty
relations. Practically, the measurement range problem weakens the security of entanglement-
based large-alphabet quantum key distribution (QKD) employing degrees of freedom including
time-frequency or electric field quadrature. We present a modified entropic uncertainty relation
that circumvents the measurement range problem under certain conditions, and apply it to
well-known QKD protocols. For time-frequency QKD, although our bound is an improvement,
we find that high channel loss poses a problem for its feasibility. In homodyne-based continuous
variable QKD, we find our bound provides a quantitative way to monitor for saturation attacks.
1. Introduction
Entropic uncertainty relations have proven to be powerful tools for quantum information, as they
provide a method for quantitatively relating the statistics of measurement outcomes, the operators
characterizing those measurements, and the amount of information different parties can have
about a system [1–8]. This proves particularly useful for determining the security offered by
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, in which trusted parties, Alice and Bob, must bound
the information held by an eavesdropper, Eve [9–14]. In particular, in an entanglement-based
protocol, the optical source and channels may not be trusted, so Alice and Bob must rely on
the characterization of their measurements and the statistics of their outcomes to determine
security [15].
Fundamental bounds on the secure key rate exist for a point-to-point quantum channel [16,17].
Nonetheless, there has been recent interest in creating more efficient QKD strategies that
employ high-dimensional photonic degrees of freedom to maximize secret bits per optical signal.
In particular, time-energy [13, 14, 18–27], orbital angular momentum [28], and electric field
quadrature [11, 29–31] are all candidates for high-dimensional degrees of freedom.
These degrees of freedom are, in principle, unbounded, while any practical detector for
measuring them only has a finite range of detection, so a natural question has been whether
the potential for the state to fall beyond the range of detection poses any serious consequences
for the security of a protocol [13, 19, 32–36]. Qi first noted the potential for a detection range
loophole in time-frequency QKD [19], with Nunn et. al. outlining a specific strategy for
exploiting the loophole [13]. In the context of both time-frequency QKD and more general
continuous variable entanglement verification and quantum cryptographic protocols, Ray and
van Enk discussed how data falling outside the measurement range compromises variance-based
measures of entanglement, and demonstrated that Rényi entropies without quantum memory
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Fig. 1. A typical scenario for the entropic uncertainty relations with quantum memory. Alice
and Bob are given quantum systems, A and B, from a source controlled by Eve, who has
quantum memory, E . Alice and Bob independently and randomly either make X-type or
Z-type measurements.
provide more optimistic bounds for verifying entanglement [32, 33]. The issues arising from
finite measurement ranges have additionally been discussed in [11, 35, 36], in the context of
homodyne-based continuous variable (CV) QKD1, with the main problem being caused by
detections above the saturation limit of the detector. A major review of CV QKD is available in
Section VI of [37].
In Section 2, we review the entropic uncertainty relations with quantum memory, as well as
how results outside the measurement range can render the relationship trivial. In Section 3, we
consider a more general problem: given a measurement outcome one would like to safely ignore,
such as the state falling outside the measurement range, we formulate a non-trivial entropic
uncertainty relation with quantum memory that depends on the probability of the problematic
outcome, rather than on the operators characterizing the problematic outcome. This bound is
particularly important for entanglement-based high-dimensional quantum cryptography protocols.
In Section 4, we discuss the modified bound in the context of time-frequency QKD, and find
that additional assumptions are required to deal with practical limitations like loss and vacuum
components. Even with some additional assumptions about the source and our modified result,
channel loss severely limits the secure key rate of the protocol. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss
the applicability of our main result to entanglement-based CV QKD using homodyne detection.
We find that, since being outside the measurement range corresponds to saturation, not loss, our
bound produces the same results as existing protocols with the added benefit that it provides a
quantitative way to guard against saturation attacks.
2. Entropic uncertainty relations and the measurement range problem
We begin this section by summarizing the unmodified entropic uncertainty relations, (a thorough
review of entropic uncertainty relations and their applications can be found in [8]). We consider
a source, potentially controlled by Eve, that distributes quantum systems A and B to Alice
and Bob, respectively, so that the total purified state is ρABE . Alice either performs a Z-type
measurement, characterized by the positive operator-valued measure (POVM), Z = {Zz
A
}z , or an
X-type measurement, characterized by the POVM, X = {Xx
A
}x . Bob also alternates between the
same two types of measurements. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the set-up.
The most information Eve can have about Alice’s Z-type measurement results is quantified by
the conditional min-entropy of Alice’s classical register, ZA, used for storing results from Z-type
measurements, given Eve’s quantum memory, E:
Hmin(ZA |E) = − log pguess(ZA |E) (1)
where pguess(ZA |E) = maxME
∑
z p
z
ZA
Tr(MzE ρzE ) is Eve’s guessing probability of ZA maximized
over all POVMs on E ,ME [3, 8, 9].
The entropic uncertainty relations with quantum memory provide a bound on Hmin(ZA |E)
[2, 4, 6]:
Hmin(ZA |E) + Hmax(XA |B) ≥ − log c(X, Z) (2)
1CV QKD commonly refers to protocols employing electric field quadratures.
where Hmax(XA |B) is the conditional max-entropy of Alice’s classical register, XA, for storing
results from X-type measurements, given Bob’s system, B. It is given by [6]:
Hmax(XA |B) = 2 logmax
σB
F(ρXAB, IXA ⊗ σB) (3)
with F(ρ, σ) = Tr(
√√
σρ
√
σ) denoting the fidelity between operators ρ and σ. Hmax(XA |B)
can be upper bounded using Hmax(XA |XB), in which the max-entropy is conditional on Bob’s
results from an X-type measurement [38]. Finally, the bound depends on the POVM elements for
the two measurements. One bound is the maximum overlap between the two POVMs:
c(X, Z) = max
x,z
| |
√
Xx
A
√
Zz
A
| |2∞ (4)
where | | · | |∞ denotes the maximum singular value [2, 6]. An equal or better bound is provided
by [5]:
c′(X, Z) = min {max
x
| |
∑
z
Zz
A
XxAZ
z
A
| |∞,max
z
| |
∑
x
XxAZ
z
A
XxA | |∞
}
. (5)
Given the reliance of the bound on the POVMs, a problem arises when Alice has POVM
elements from X and Z that cause c(X, Z) ≈ 1. The general problem can be summarized as
follows: Alice has two POVMs, Z = {Zz
A
}NZ
z=1 ∪ {Z∅A} and X = {XxA}NXx=1 ∪ {X∅A}, such that
| |
√
Z∅
A
√
X∅
A
| |2∞ ≈ 1, while | |
√
Zz
A
√
Xx
A
| |2∞ < 1 for the other POVM elements. The elements
denoted with “∅” indicate some measurement outcomes that cause c(X, Z) ≈ 1. For convenience,
we will often refer to these as “null” measurement outcomes, since a common way for c(X, Z) ≈ 1
is when the detector does not register a result; however, we do not specify a form for these
elements, meaning in general they can correspond to any measurement outcomes with POVM
elements that are problematic for the maximum overlap. The current entropic uncertainty relation
would provide a trivial bound due to these null measurements, but ideally we would like to salvage
a bound using the other POVM elements that do not saturate the overlap. In the next section
we provide a modified entropic uncertainty relation in which Alice and Bob can still bound
Eve’s information about the Z-type measurement outcomes, in terms of the X-type measurement
outcomes for 1 ≤ x ≤ NX , the POVM elements from {ZzA}NZz=1 and {XxA}NXx=1, and the probability
Alice’s measurements return null outcomes.
Before introducing the bound, we illustrate the relevance of this limitation to current entropic
uncertainty relations by considering what occurs when Alice has basis-dependent limitations on
her measurement range [11,13,19,32,33]. For instance, if Alice were measuring the frequency of
a single photon, she might have NZ POVM elements for describing the NZ frequency bins that the
detector can resolve, plus the null measurement POVM element, Z∅
A
, to characterize the result of
the photon falling outside the bandwidth of the detector. If her X-type measurement corresponds
to an arrival-time measurement, then she will also have a finite number of bins with good timing
resolution, then a null measurement element, X∅
A
, corresponding to the case when the photon
arrived before or after her well-resolved time bins. One might think that because frequency and
arrival-time are non-commuting observables, Alice and Bob would be able to have a non-trivial
bound on Eve’s information. Unfortunately, in such a case, because the null measurement POVM
elements are measurement-dependent (i.e. Z∅
A
, X∅
A
) and span a semi-infinite region of the
Hilbert space, c(X, Z) = | |
√
Z∅
A
√
X∅
A
| |2∞ ≈ 1.
To resolve this issue, one might be tempted to discard all the null outcomes from the frequency
and arrival-time measurements, and bound the conditional min-entropy of the remaining data
from the frequency measurement using the remaining data from the arrival-time measurement.
By only maximizing the overlap over the POVM elements corresponding to the well-resolved
bins, perhaps one can discount the null measurement POVM elements. However, a conceptually
simple strategy, outlined in [13], can be used by Eve to make Alice and Bob overestimate
the conditional min-entropy: Eve can make measurements of the photon frequency with very
narrow bin widths, such that when Alice and Bob perform arrival-time measurements, the most
likely outcome is a null measurement. Thus, Eve gains all information about frequency without
introducing any errors to their frequency measurements, and Alice and Bob will almost always
discard the arrival-time events for which Eve does not have any information and which would
otherwise be used to bound Eve’s information.
Note that this problem occurs when the null measurement POVM element depends on the
measurement type, i.e. when X∅
A
, Z∅
A
[12]. In Appendix 1, we show that, when the null
measurement POVM element is the same in both measurements, which can naively lead to
c(X, Z) = 1, one can always formulate an entropic uncertainty relation in terms of the POVM
elements of a related, effective measurement that does not have the problematic null measurement
element. We show how to construct the related, effective measurement, and discuss why the
approach for solving the problem when the null measurement is basis-independent fails when the
null measurement is basis-dependent.
3. A modified entropic uncertainty relation
Our main result is a modified entropic uncertainty relation for a scenario in which Alice has
specific outcomes in Z- and X-type measurements for which the POVM elements characterizing
those outcomes yield a trivial bound on Eve’s information, but those outcomes have low probability
of occuring. Our result allows Alice and Bob to achieve a sometimes better bound on Eve’s
information about the measurement outcomes, with no extra characterization of the state required,
simply by including the fact that the problematic outcomes have a low probability of occuring.
Main result : For a tripartite state, ρABE , and two POVMs onHA, Z = {ZzA}NZz=1 ∪ {Z∅A} and
X = {Xx
A
}NX
x=1 ∪ {X∅A},
Hmin(ZA |E) ≥ −2 log
[√
p∅ZA +
√
p∅XA +
√
1 − p∅XA
√
c<(X, Z)
(√
2
Hmax(X<A |B)
)]
(6)
where p∅ZA = Tr(ρAZ∅A) and p∅XA = Tr(ρAX∅A) are Alice’s probabilities of null measurements
from Z- and X-type measurements. Hmax(X<A |B) is the conditional max-entropy of Alice’s X-type
measurement results, after she has discarded the null measurements, given Bob’s system. Finally,
c<(X, Z) = max
(x,z),∅
| |
√
Xx
A
√
Zz
A
| |2∞ (7)
is the maximum overlap for the Z and X POVM elements, excluding the null measurement POVM
elements that cause the original bound to saturate.
Practically, the quantities in Eq. (6) are as experimentally accessible as those in Eq. (2), the
unmodified entropic uncertainty relation. The new maximum overlap in Eq. (7) can be calculated
after having characterized the POVMs for the detectors [39]. The null measurement probabilities
can be calculated directly from the statistics of the measurement outcomes. Hmax(X<A |B)
can be bounded from above by Hmax(X<A |XB), the conditional max-entropy of Alice’s X type
measurement, after she has discarded the null measurements, given Bob’s X measurement results.
As we discuss in Section 4, Bob may need to make some modifications to his data, like replacing
his null outcomes with bit values fitted to Alice’s distribution. Hmax(X<A |XB) can be further
bounded from above using methods from [14].
The result is quite general: we make no assumptions about the dimension of the Hilbert
spaces or the commutation relations between the POVM elements. The proof of this result
is available in Appendix 2. We use similar analytical techniques from [6], which provides a
Fig. 2. Contour plot of the lower bound, in bits, on Hmin(ZA |E) as a function of p∅ZA and
p∅
XA
as given by Eq. (6). We have fixed Hmax(X<A |B) = 1, which corresponds to a noiseless
scenario, and c< = 10−3, which is an experimentally feasible value in time-frequency
QKD [14]. This plot corresponds to best-case scenarios for the bound, and provides
necessary conditions on the values of p∅
ZA
and p∅
XA
for protocols employing Eq. (6) to
prove security, with the black region corresponding to no proven security. Assuming no
noise, for c< = 10−3, the maximum tolerable equal probability of null measurement is
p∅
ZA
= p∅
XA
≈ 23.2%, while in the limit c< → 0, p∅
ZA
= p∅
XA
= 25%. Of course, if we
make p∅
ZA
smaller, we gain tolerance for higher p∅
XA
, and vice versa. For example, with
p∅
ZA
= 10−3, p∅
XA
can be as high as ∼92%.
proof of Eq. (2). Additionally, we use the form of the fidelity function in terms of trace norm,
F(ρ, σ) = | |√ρ√σ | |Tr, and exploit the triangle inequality property for norms. In Appendix 3, we
provide a smoothed version of the bound, which could be used to include finite-size effects, as
Eq. (6) is valid for the asymptotic limit.
As stated above, our result provides a sometimes better bound on Hmin(ZA |E), and so a few
comments are in order on the applicability of the result. First, note that if
√
p∅ZA +
√
p∅XA exceeds
1 then the trivial lower bound of Hmin(ZA |E) ≥ 0 is better. See Figure 2 for a contour plot of
necessary values of p∅ZA and p
∅
XA
for a non-trivial bound. Having reasonable values of p∅XA and
p∅ZA depends on what X
∅
A
and Z∅
A
correspond to physically. For example, in Section 4, in the
context of time-frequency QKD, these null measurement probabilities should ideally correspond
to the probability that single photons arriving at Alice’s detectors fall outside her measurement
ranges, resulting in no detector clicks; however, in practice, there are many scenarios that also
result in null detection, including loss and vacuum components. While these other scenarios do
not compromise security, they certainly cause an overestimation of p∅XA and p
∅
ZA
and a pessimistic
bound on the secure key rate. We will discuss what additional assumptions may need to be made
to achieve a good bound. In Section 5, when we discuss homodyne-based CV QKD, X∅
A
and
Z∅
A
correspond to quadrature intensities above the saturation limit of the detectors; in practice,
saturation probabilities can be kept low, so fewer assumptions are needed to achieve a good
bound.
Second, to tolerate higher null measurement probabilities, one requires low values of c<(X, Z)
and Hmax(X<A |B). The former can be achieved if the degree of freedom being measured is
high-dimensional and the Z- and X-type measurements are non-commuting, while the latter can
be achieved if Alice and Bob’s systems are highly entangled. We will show in the next two
sections that our bound provides insight into the security proofs for entanglement-based time-
frequency, and continuous variable QKD using homodyne detection, two protocols employing
high-dimensional degrees of freedom and Fourier pair measurements.
4. Application to time-frequency QKD
One of the main applications for entropic uncertainty relations is in proofs of the security of QKD
protocols. QKD is a method for two spatially separated parties, Alice and Bob, to establish a
shared, secret cryptographic key in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, where, for instance, the
results of one measurement can be used to form the key, and the results of the other measurement
can be used to bound Eve’s information about the key [40]. A distinction is made between
prepare-and-measure protocols, in which Alice uses a fully-characterized source to send signals
to Bob, who has fully-characterized measurements, and entanglement-based protocols, in which
Alice and Bob both have full characterization of their measurements, and an untrusted source
outputs states for them to measure. The prepare-and-measure scenario can usually be framed
in terms of the entanglement-based scenario [15], and the latter is suited to be analyzed using
entropic uncertainty relations, since the statistics of the measurement outcomes and the POVMs
characterizing the measurement can be used to bound Eve’s information.
One example of a QKD protocol for which our main result is particularly relevant is time-
frequency QKD. Time-frequency QKD employs single photon frequency and arrival-time as
non-commuting observables to establish a key [18]. In an entanglement-based protocol, an
untrusted source would output two spatial modes, one sent to Alice and one to Bob, who would
then randomly alternate between measuring frequency and arrival-time, with each observable
having bins of finite width into which results can fall.
Typically, Alice’s frequency POVM in the single photon subspace, Fideal, is idealized with
elements [13]:
FmA =
∫ ωm+δω/2
ωm−δω/2
dω
2pi
|ω〉〈ω | (8)
where ωm is the central frequency of the bin; δω is the bin width; and |ω〉 is a frequency
eigenstate with normalization 〈ω |ω′〉 = 2piδ(ω − ω′) [14]. It is often assumed that the central
frequencies of the bins are defined over positive and negative frequencies [13, 27], although
some have modified the definition to include only positive frequencies [14]. Of course, a full
characterization of Alice’s measurement will also include POVM elements for vacuum and
multiphoton contributions; we will return to this issue later in our discussion.
The arrival-time eigenstates are defined as Fourier pairs of the frequency eigenstates, with
Alice’s arrival-time POVM in the single photon subspace,Tideal, typically defined by elements [14]:
TkA =
∫ tk+δt/2
tk−δt/2
dt |t〉〈t |, (9)
where tk is the central arrival time of the bin; δt is the bin width; and |t〉 =
∫ +∞
−∞
dω
2pi e
iωt |ω〉 is the
Fourier transform of |ω〉. As with frequency, the sequence of central times extends over positive
and negative arrival times.
Using Eq. (4), these POVMs yield a maximum overlap of:
c(Tideal, Fideal) = δωδt2pi S
(1)
0 (1,
δωδt
4
)2 (10)
where S(1)0 (·, ·) is the 0th radial prolate spheroidal wave function of the first kind [8, 41]. Eq. (10)
is roughly proportional to δωδt when their product is small [41]. As expected, c(Tideal, Fideal) → 1
as the bin width product grows.
The obvious problem with this characterization is that realistic detectors cannot have a constant
bin width over all frequencies and arrival-times. For instance, a typical source for time-frequency
entangled photons may have a repetition rate on the order of 10 MHz [20, 42], which would limit
the range of arrival-times that can be employed. Additionally, the best single photon detectors
have high efficiency in a finite spectral range of a few tens of nanometers about 1550 nm [43].
We assume that when the photon falls beyond these ranges of the detectors, the detectors do not
click. Thus, one step towards a more realistic characterization of the measurements is to include
the null measurement elements corresponding to when the photon falls outside the temporal
range in the arrival-time measurement or the spectral range in the frequency measurement. If the
temporal range is from [−tc, tc], then T∅A =
∫ −tc
−∞ dt |t〉〈t | +
∫ +∞
tc
dt |t〉〈t |. If the spectral range is
from [ωo − ωc, ωo + ωc], then F∅A =
∫ ωo−ωc
−∞
dω
2pi |ω〉〈ω | +
∫ +∞
ωo+ωc
dω
2pi |ω〉〈ω |. Thus, the refined
POVMs are T = {Tk
A
}NT
k=1 ∪ {T∅A} and F = {FmA }NFm=1 ∪ {F∅A}, where we assume that tc (ωc) or δt
(δω) can be chosen so that the NT (NF ) bins can be defined within [−tc, tc] ([ωo −ωc, ωo +ωc]).
Based on (10), c(T, F) ≈ 1 since the null measurement bins have, in principle, infinite width. As
discussed previously, this has been a known issue for time-frequency QKD [13,19].
A common suggestion for dealing with this problem has been to apply pre-measurement
filters to exclude the frequencies or arrival-times that would not be detected [13,19]. Consider,
however, that for the unmodified bound, the maximum overlap in Eq. (4) is not sensitive to the
probabilities of different measurement outcomes, only to the POVM elements. This means that,
as Eq. (2) stands, it does not necessarily matter that a filter could keep those probabilities low.
Thus, without modifying the entropic uncertainty relations, the only way to ensure that we can
safely disregard the null measurement POVM elements with semi-infinite support that saturate
Eq. (4) is to ensure that the state has no shared support with those POVM elements, effectively
reducing the problem to the smaller subspace defined by the support of the state. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to construct a filter that could simultaneously ensure compact support in the time
domain and frequency domain [44]. In other words, we cannot simultaneously make the state
have exactly zero probability of yielding null measurements on the spaces of T∅
A
and F∅
A
without
filtering out all of the state. As long as there is some non-zero probability, one would need to
consider the POVM elements on that space, which saturate Eq. (4) and render the unmodified
entropic uncertainty relations trivial.
Alternatively, as discussed in [32, 33], one could assume that there exists a cut-off outside the
measurement range, and that the probability of a result beyond the cut-off is negligible, using
less coarse-grained measurements with a wider range to estimate this probability. We would
then need to ask how small that probability needs to be, and how to quantify its effect within the
bound on security.
Our main result, Eq. (6), is a step towards dealing with this problem. In [14], an ideal source
for time-frequency entangled photons has a biphoton wavefunction modelled as:
ψ(ωA, ωB) =
exp[−(ωA − ωB)2σ2cor/4 − (ωA + ωB)2σ2coh]√
pi/2σcohσcor
(11)
where ωA and ωB are relative to the central telecom frequency; σcoh, the coherence time, is
taken to be 6 ns, and σcor , the correlation time, is taken to be 2 ps. Assuming the spectral
range is between 1520 nm and 1610 nm [43], the state in Eq. (11) yields a probability for a
null outcome in the frequency measurement of p∅FA = 0 (to within machine precision2). Note
that this is in the best case scenario when an eavesdropper is not tampering with the value;
of course, in a real-world entanglement-based QKD scenario this probability value would be
measured from the data. Using a repitition rate of 55.6 MHz [14], Eq. (11) yields a probability
for a null outcome in the arrival-time measurement of p∅TA ≈ 0.27%. We can upper bound
2We used MATLAB, for which a positive value less than 2−52 is treated as 0 [45].
c<(T, F) = maxk,m,∅ | |
√
Tk
A
√
Fm
A
| |2∞ by c(Tideal, Fideal) since the sets of POVMs over which the
former is maximized are subsets of the sets over which the latter is maximized. Again using
values from [14], this yields c< ≤ 10−3.
The original problem was that the unmodified entropic uncertainty relation, Eq. (2), was
rendered trivial by the overlap | |
√
Z∅
A
√
X∅
A
| |2∞ ≈ 1, so it is a clear improvement that the
new maximum overlap, c<, is no longer saturated by the null measurement POVM elements.
Unfortunately, a new problem arises when applying Eq. (6) in a practical implementation
of entanglement-based, time-frequency QKD: p∅FA , p
∅
TA
, and Hmax(X<A |B) will all need to
be estimated using the measurement data, a task limited by source, coupling, and channel
imperfections.
In a true entanglement-based scenario, only the detectors are trusted. This means that the
source, channels and couplings are not. In Eq. (6), p∅FA and p
∅
TA
should ideally correspond to the
probabilities that the single photon portion of Alice’s state yields null measurements. However,
less than ideal devices may result in an overestimation of these parameters.
First, the source will pose a problem due to vacuum components since since vacuum states
also yield null measurements. For example, a common choice for creating spectrally entangled
photon pairs is a spontaneous parametric down-conversion device, which can have low conversion
efficiency [21]. Therefore, to get a better estimate on p∅FA and p
∅
TA
, Alice would ideally want to
determine the probability the untrusted source emits a vacuum state. While passive decoy state
methods allow for the characterization of the photon number distribution for untrusted sources in
single-mode QKD [46], we are not aware of any methods for characterizing the photon number
distribution of an untrusted source for high-dimensional QKD employing many time-frequency
modes. Thus, short of such methods, the source will be untrusted and uncharacterized, and we
would have to allow null measurements due to vacuum components to be part of the estimation
of p∅FA and p
∅
TA
. However, as shown in Figure 2, this would mean the probability of a vacuum
component would need to be less than 25%, and that is additionally on condition that there
be perfect correlations in measurement results, and a very low value of c<. This may not be
possible with current technology, as increasing the number of photon pairs is typically achieved
by pumping at higher intensities which also results in increasing the number of multiphoton
contributions [47]. Multiphoton detection events are a source of noise [48], and thus the high
correlations between Alice and Bob’s data will be unattainable.
Second, the problem caused by in-lab coupling from the channels to the detectors is conceptually
similar: a lost photon yields a null measurement. Even if the couplings induce a basis-independent
loss, if we do not want to trust the couplings, we will need to factor their contribution to null
measurements into the estimation of p∅FA and p
∅
TA
. To have a non-trivial bound, that loss cannot
be greater than 25%, on condition that vacuum contributions are negligible, correlations between
measurement results are high, and we have a very low value of c<.
There is clearly a practicality problem if we do not trust the source since there are so many
scenarios that can cause a null measurement. The problem can be slightly improved if we allow
partial characterization of the source and in-lab couplings, weakening the full entanglement-based
assumption. For instance, Alice need not know the full biphoton wavefunction, but if she can
know the probability that the source outputs a vacuum state and characterize the basis-independent
coupling losses between the source and her detector, then she can have a much better estimate
of p∅FA and p
∅
TA
. This is because she can first use the process from Appendix 1 to discount any
negative impact due to basis-independent null measurement POVM elements, and then she can
use Eq. (6) to treat the remaining, basis-dependent null measurements, whose impact on security
is treated via the probabilities p∅FA and p
∅
TA
. With no tampering of her single photon component,
she should expect the very low values for p∅FA and p
∅
TA
calculated earlier.
However, in all QKD protocols the channel is untrusted. In Eq. (6), Hmax(X<A |B) should
Fig. 3. Key rate vs. distance for time-frequency QKD, accounting for security repercussions
of null measurements on Bob’s side. For the state in Eq. (11), we have set σcoh = 6ns,
and σcor = 2ps [14]. To employ Eq. (6) we have used c< = 10−3, p∅TA = 0.27%, and
p∅
FA
= 0%. We have bounded Hmax(T<A |B) using techniques from [14], employing a bin
width of δt = 20ps. See the text for additional assumptions. Previous security analysis of
time-frequency QKD in [14] presented non-zero key rate at distances of >150 km, but the
proof does not provide security against the measurement range problem. Our new bound
widens the region of security to more than 2 km.
ideally be the conditional max-entropy of Alice’s measurement outcomes from single photon
components that fell within her measurement range, given the single photons that arrived at Bob’s
detector. Unfortunately, Bob will have additional null measurements due to all the photons lost in
the channel. Even if Bob can discard null measurements due to the source outputting a vacuum
component, or due to coupling from the channel to his detector, he will have to assume all the
null measurements due to loss in the channel are instead due to single photons falling outside his
detector range. Since there will be cases where Alice did not have a null measurement while Bob
did, Bob’s strategy in those cases will then be to assign a bit value to these null outcomes based
off the publicly known probability distribution of Alice’s results, to have a lower chance of error.
Using the state in Eq. (11), with a loss of 0.2 dB/km in fiber, assuming Alice has partial
characterization of her source so she can safely estimate her null measurement probabilities to
be p∅FA = 0 and p
∅
TA
= 0.27%, and taking c< = 10−3, the bound on Hmin(FA |E) − H(FA |FB)
still saturates at ∼2 km, even in an ideal case where Alice and Bob have no dark counts and
Eve has not interfered with the results, as shown in Figure 3. Here, H(FA |FB) is the conditional
Shannon entropy of Alice’s frequency results given Bob’s, and it is used to quantify the number
of bits to correct errors in the key [13, 40]; in this case, it will be non-zero even in noiseless
channels because of the finite coherence time of the state. We used methods from [14] to bound
Hmax(T<A |B). Note that our result significantly differs from the distance of >150 km presented
in [14]; however, their analysis did not address the measurement range problem, so it would not
provide security given realistic limitations on the measurement range. We have shown the region
of security can be expanded, albeit slightly, to more than 2 km.
It appears that bounding the security of entanglement-based time-frequency QKD with a
completely untrusted source is still impractical using Eq. (6). With knowledge of the source’s
vacuum component probability, and characterization of their coupling losses, Alice and Bob
can achieve a better bound on Hmin(FA |E), but only if the channel distance to Bob is very
short. The result may still be useful for applications of time-frequency entanglement other than
entanglement-based communication, such as entanglement witnessing [2].
Clearly, time-frequency QKD with arrival-time and frequency treated as Fourier pairs of
each other is not feasible with an untrusted source and current levels of loss; seeing that the
null measurements depend on the type of measurement, loss must be treated as a threat to
security. We therefore have the following outlook for time-frequency QKD: if one wants to
continue characterizing arrival-time and frequency as Fourier pairs, then one will need to move
to a prepare-and-measure or a measurement-device-independent QKD setting. For the former
approach, the equivalence between prepare-and-measure and entanglement-based QKD that is
often used for security proofs will need to be carefully considered, since an entanglement-based
approach is untenable. Alternatively, it may be fruitful to re-examine the characterization of
arrival-time and frequency measurements: it is likely that one is not measuring perfect Fourier
pairs in the lab, so perhaps the newly-characterized observables that one is measuring will
end up having basis-independent null measurements, which we know not to be a problem for
security. Finally, some work has been done to implement measurements in arrival-time-like
and frequency-like measurements: rather than measuring Fourier pairs of observables, one
either makes a measurement in a basis of d arrival times, {|tn〉}d−1n=0 , or in a superposition basis,
{| fm〉 = ∑d−1n=0 exp(2piinm/d)|tn〉}d−1m=0 [22,23]. In that case, the measurement range problem is
averted because the system of interest is now defined on an effective subspace in which there are
lower probabilities of basis-dependent null measurements.
5. Application to homodyne-based continuous variable QKD
CV QKD exploits the electric field quadratures as the non-commuting observables to establish a
secret key. In a typical entanglement-based protocol employing homodyne detection, an untrusted
source sends one mode to Alice, another to Bob, and they each randomly perform either X
or P quadrature measurements [29,30]. Entanglement-based CV QKD employing heterodyne
detection is also possible [49–52]; however, the entropic uncertainty relations are not applicable
for proving security in such schemes [50, 52], so we do not consider them here as our result
relates to a modification of the entropic uncertainty relations.
In close analogy to time-frequency QKD, for a homodyne-based CV QKD protocol, Alice
sorts her results into bins, yielding the POVMs for X and P quadrature measurements with
elements [11]:
XmA =
∫ xm+δ/2
xm−δ/2
dx |x〉〈x |, PkA =
∫ pk+δ/2
pk−δ/2
dp|p〉〈p| (12)
where |x〉 and |p〉 are the eigenstates of the quadrature operators. If the constant bin width, δ,
can be maintained across the entire measurement range, then we should expect an expression for
the maximum overlap just like Eq. (10), since that equation is derived for general continuous
variables respecting Heisenberg-like uncertainty relations [41].
Of course, as with time-frequency QKD, we cannot expect the same level of coarse-graining
over the entire Hilbert space. Above some intensity level, the detectors will become saturated.
The measurement operators characterizing saturation in the X and P measurements will be
defined over semi-infinite ranges, meaning c ≈ 1 [11]. The suggestion made in [11] for dealing
with this issue is that one needs to trust the source, assume it has a low probability of saturating
the detectors, and then incorporate that probability into the smoothing parameter for the entropic
uncertainty relations resulting in a failure probability for the protocol. In [31], the solution is to
assume that the energy of the source is bounded, so that the probability for saturation can be
estimated.
This issue has been discussed in [35, 36], in the context of the Gaussian modulated coherent
state protocol, a prepare-and-measure setting. They found that an eavesdropper can shift the
mean of the distribution of results into the saturation regime, simultaneously lowering the
variance of results, which causes Alice and Bob to overestimate the security of their key. Among
countermeasures suggested, they discussed introducing a confidence interval for the results, and
if too many results fall beyond the confidence interval, Alice and Bob ought to abort the protocol;
however, the range of this confidence interval and the threshold probability for aborting the
protocol were left open for future work.
Our main result, Eq. (6), addresses this gap: our bound depends explicitly on the probabilities
of saturating the detectors, p∅XA and p
∅
PA
, which can be measured from the data without having to
trust the source. This provides a way for Alice and Bob to monitor how many results are beyond
their confidence interval, guarding against a saturation attack by Eve. Note that, by depending
on p∅XA and p
∅
PA
, our bound additionally provides an implicit way to include the choice of the
measurement range as an optimization parameter for the protocol.
Note the major difference between the problematic measurements in time-frequency and CV
QKD using homodyne detection. In the former, losing a photon had the same consequence
for security as falling outside the measurement range, since both resulted in the detector not
clicking; the high loss in fiber optic channels compromised security after a short distance.
In homodyne-based CV QKD, however, saturation is problematic, and luckily the fiber optic
channel will not naturally introduce gain that will convert a low intensity signal into a saturating
signal. Other than tampering, the main source for detector saturation is due to the tails of the
Gaussian distributions in phase space from the two-mode squeezed vacuum states used for
entanglement-based protocols. Luckily, these probabilities are vanishingly small. For example,
in [31], the range of measurement is [-61.6, 61.6] in units of vacuum noise, and using an
anti-squeezing factor of 19.3 dB [53], this yields p∅XA = p
∅
PA
≈ 0 to within machine precision.
We should not expect the results with the new bound to differ from [31], since Eq. (6) reduces to
Eq. (2) when those probabilities are zero.
6. Conclusion
We have presented a modified entropic uncertainty relation to discount unwanted POVM elements
that render the unmodified entropic uncertainty relation trivial. This is done at the cost of
including the probability of the unwanted measurement in the bound. Our bound offers insight into
the measurement range problem, which poses an issue for the characterization of entanglement in
high-dimensional systems. We applied the bound to analyze entanglement-based time-frequency
QKD, and found that, unlike previous results, we can now guarantee security; however, this is
conditional on low loss and high detection efficiency within the measurement range. In a practical
setting, this may only be achievable with some characterization of the source, like knowing the
probability a vacuum state is emitted, weakening the completely untrusted source assumption
of entanglement-based QKD. Under realistic conditions, the key becomes insecure at ∼2 km,
mainly due to the high loss in fiber. Finally, we discussed our bound as it related to saturation
attacks in CV QKD employing homodyne detection schemes. Through the bound’s dependence
on the probability of detector saturation, we provide a new quantitative way to guard against
saturation attacks, without any assumptions about the source but with full characterization of the
measurements.
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Appendix 1: Basis-independent null measurements pose no problem for entropic
uncertainty relations
We show that if the null measurement is independent of the measurement type, then we can
always reformulate an entropic uncertainty relation that does not depend on the null measurement
operator common to both measurement types. However, it depends on new, effective POVMs
related to the original POVMs. We show how those can be constructed.
LetH be the total Hilbert space. Supposewe have twomeasurements, Z and X , characterized by
POVMs Z = {Zn}NZn=0∪N and X = {Xm}NXm=0∪N, whereN = I−
∑NZ
n=0 Zn = I−
∑NX
m=0 Xm = I−M
represents the basis-independent null measurement.
We can defineHN (HM) to be the space on which N (M) has support. In general,HN andHM
will have overlap, withHN ∪HM = H .
With the definition of those spaces in hand, we can treat some operators in the problem as the
direct sum of operators with support only onHM, and of the zero operator onH/HM:
M = (M)HM ⊕ 0H/HM
Zn = (Zn)HM ⊕ 0H/HM
Xm = (Xm)HM ⊕ 0H/HM
(13)
where (·)HM denotes an operator with only support onHM.
Claim: [√(M)HM ]−1 is well-defined.
Proof: As a POVM element,M is Hermitian and non-negative, so all its eigenvalues are real
and non-negative. Moreover, when we consider the operator (M)HM , we have now restricted
to only the eigenvalues that are positive. Thus, the square root of (M)HM is well-defined, and
invertible. 
We can now define new operators:
Z˜n =
[√(M)HM ]−1(Zn)HM [√(M)HM ]−1
X˜m =
[√(M)HM ]−1(Xm)HM [√(M)HM ]−1. (14)
Claim: Z˜ = {Z˜n}NZn=0 and X˜ = {X˜m}NXm=0 each form a POVM onHM.
Proof: To show Z˜ is a POVM we need to show its elements are Hermitian and non-negative,
and that they sum to IM. Because (Zn)HM and [
√(M)HM ]−1 are Hermitian and non-negative, then
Z˜n =
[√(M)HM ]−1(Zn)HM [√(M)HM ]−1 is also Hermitian and non-negative. Moreover, we can
check:
NZ∑
n=0
Z˜n =
[√(M)HM ]−1 NZ∑
n=0
(Zn)HM
[√(M)HM ]−1
=
[√(M)HM ]−1(M)HM [√(M)HM ]−1 = IM. (15)
The same process follows for X˜ . 
Now that we have two new effective POVMs, we will use them to understand an equivalence
between two different scenarios:
Scenario 1 (a “realistic” model): An untrusted source outputs to Alice a state ρ that could be
entangled with Eve and/or Bob. With probability q, Alice performs a Z measurement, and with
probability (1 − q) Alice performs an X measurement. Alice knows what type of measurement
she is performing. Both Z and X measurements include the null measurement element, N.
Depending on if she performs a Z measurement or an X measurement, Alice records the result in
separate registers, RZ or RX , respectively. After many iterations, Alice considers two probability
distributions: p(m|ρ, X,¬N) (p(n|ρ, Z,¬N)) is the distribution of measurement results given she
performed an X (Z) measurement on the incoming state, ρ, and post-selected to discard the null
measurement. This distribution represents the state of the register, RX (RZ ), having discarded
null measurements. The POVMs characterizing the Z and X measurements have been outlined in
the previous section.
Scenario 2 (a fictitious model): An untrusted source outputs the same state ρ, but before it is
sent to Alice, Eve passes it through a filter that blocks the state if it returns the null measurement,
and lets it pass if it does not return the null measurement. The state Alice then receives is:
ρ′ =
√
Mρ
√
M
Tr(ρM) . (16)
Note that this state is only non-zero onHM because it filters out the portion of the state that has
support onH/HM.
Now Alice performs either one of the two new measurements we defined, Z˜ or X˜ , which are
related to, but different from, Z and X . Similarly to before, depending on if she performs a Z˜
measurement or an X˜ measurement, Alice records the result in separate registers, R˜Z or R˜X ,
respectively. After many iterations, Alice considers two probability distributions: p(m|ρ′, X˜)
(p(n|ρ′, Z˜)) is the distribution of measurement results given that an X˜ (Z˜) measurement was
performed on the incoming state, ρ′. This distribution represents the state of the register, R˜X
(R˜Z ).
One can check that:
p(m|ρ′, X˜) = p(m|ρ, X,¬N) = Tr(ρXm)
Tr(ρM)
p(n|ρ′, Z˜) = p(n|ρ, Z,¬N) = Tr(ρZn)
Tr(ρM) .
(17)
Thus, because Alice cannot distinguish between these two distributions, we can assume Eve can
have control of when a null measurement outcome will occur.
We can now examine an entropic uncertainty relation for Scenario 2. Note that an entropic
uncertainty relation for Scenario 1 would lead to the trivial lower bound of 0 on Hmin(Z |E)
because of the overlap between the common null measurement element in both POVM sets:
c(X, Z) = | |N| |2∞ = 1 because the eigenvalues of N onH/HM are all 1.
Because X˜ and Z˜ are both POVMs onHM, the only space on which ρ′ can have support, then:
Hmin(Z˜ |E)ρ′ + Hmax(X˜ |B)ρ′ ≥ − logmax
m,n
| |
√
Z˜n
√
X˜m | |2.
Hence, we have provided a proof that basis-independent null measurements do not pose a problem
for entanglement-based QKD protocols.
Note that the same process cannot be done with basis-dependent null measurements since there
would not necessarily be a common POVM element N. Thus, defining the subspace,HM, would
not be possible, precluding the definition of new effective POVMs, Z˜ and X˜ , and the reduction to
an entropic uncertainty relation in terms of just those operators.
Appendix 2: Proof of main result, Eq. (6)
We assume a tripartite state, ρABE , and two POVMs on HA, Z = {ZzA}NZz=1 ∪ {Z∅A} and
X = {Xx
A
}NX
x=1 ∪ {X∅A}. We begin by following the procedure from [6]. Define ρZZ′ABE =
VZZ′ρABEV
†
ZZ′ , where VZZ′ =
∑NZ
z=1 |z〉Z |z〉Z′
√
Zz
A
+ |∅〉Z |∅〉Z′
√
Z∅
A
is an isometry that maps the
input state to a state entangled with the Z register. As in [6], we start from the duality relation:
Hmin(Z |E) + Hmax(Z |Z ′AB) ≥ 0. (18)
Based on the definition for conditional max entropy in Eq. (3), we see our task is to upper
bound maxσZ′AB F(ρZZ′AB, IZ ⊗ σZ′AB). One of our objectives is to remove dependence on Z∅A,
so we first prove a useful lemma.
Lemma: For a composite Hilbert space, HC ⊗ HD , if
√
ΓC
√
IC − ΓC = 0 for some
positive operator ΓC on HC such that IC − ΓC is also positive, then F(ρCD, IC ⊗ σD) ≤
F(ρCD, ΓC ⊗ σD) + F(ρCD, (IC − ΓC) ⊗ σD).
Proof: Consider the trace norm formulation of the fidelity, and recall the triangle inequality
for norms. Thus,
F(ρCD, IC⊗σD) = | |√ρCD
√
IC ⊗ σD | |Tr ≤ ||√ρCD
√
ΓC ⊗ σD | |Tr+| |√ρCD
√
(IC − ΓC) ⊗ σD | |Tr
(19)
on condition we can write
√
IC ⊗ σD =
√
ΓC ⊗ σD +
√(IC − ΓC) ⊗ σD . Consider the square of
both sides:
IC ⊗ σD = IC ⊗ σD +
√
ΓC ⊗ σD
√
(IC − ΓC) ⊗ σD +
√
(IC − ΓC) ⊗ σD
√
ΓC ⊗ σD
= IC ⊗ σD +
√
ΓC
√
(IC − ΓC) ⊗ σD +
√
(IC − ΓC)
√
ΓC ⊗ σD .
(20)
We see the equality holds if
√
ΓC
√
IC − ΓC = 0. 
Note that IZ⊗σZ′AB = |∅〉〈∅|Z⊗σZ′AB+∑NZz=1 |z〉〈z |Z⊗σZ′AB, and√|∅〉〈∅|Z√∑NZz=1 |z〉〈z |Z =
0, so we use the lemma to find:
F(ρZZ′AB, IZ ⊗σZ′AB) ≤ F(ρZZ′AB, |∅〉〈∅|Z ⊗σZ′AB)+F(ρZZ′AB,
NZ∑
z=1
|z〉〈z |Z ⊗σZ′AB). (21)
Using the data-processing inequality for fidelities [5], F(ρ, σ) ≤ F[E(ρ), E(σ)], where E(·) is a
trace-preserving, completely positive map, we find:
F(ρZZ′AB, |∅〉〈∅|Z ⊗ σZ′AB) ≤ F(ρZ, |∅〉〈∅|Z ) =
√
p∅ZA . (22)
Next, we use the fact from [6] that relative entropies are invariant under isometries. Since the
max relative entropy is simply proportional to the logarithm of the fidelity, this means fidelity is
also invariant under isometries. Following the process done in equation (6) of the supplementary
material of [6], we get:
F(ρZZ′AB,
NZ∑
z=1
|z〉〈z |Z ⊗ σZ′AB) ≤ F(ρAB,V†ZZ′
NZ∑
z=1
|z〉〈z |Z ⊗ σZ′ABVZZ′)
= F
[
ρAB,TrZ′(
NZ∑
z=1
|z〉〈z |
√
Zz
A
σZ′AB
√
Zz
A
)] . (23)
Note that TrZ′(∑NZz=1 |z〉〈z |√ZzAσZ′AB√ZzA) may not be a normalized density matrix, but we will
fix this later.
Now,we define the isometry associatedwith theX-typemeasurement,VXX′ =
∑NX
x=1 |x〉X |x〉X′
√
Xx
A
+
|∅〉X |∅〉X′
√
X∅
A
, use again the fact that fidelity is invariant under isometries, and again use the
data-processing inequality to trace over subsystems A and X ′:
F
[
ρAB,TrZ′(
NZ∑
z=1
|z〉〈z |
√
Zz
A
σZ′AB
√
Zz
A
)]
≤ F
{
ρXB,
∑
x
|x〉〈x |X ⊗ TrZ′A
[ NZ∑
z=1
(
|z〉〈z |Z′ ⊗
√
Zz
A
XxA
√
Zz
A
)
σZ′AB
]} (24)
where ρXB =
∑
x |x〉〈x |X ⊗ TrA
(
ρABX
x
A
)
. We now note:
F
{
ρXB,
∑
x
|x〉〈x |X ⊗ TrZ′A
[ NZ∑
z=1
(
|z〉〈z |Z′ ⊗
√
Zz
A
XxA
√
Zz
A
)
σZ′AB
]}
= F
{
|∅〉〈∅|X ⊗ TrA
(
ρABX
∅
A
)
, |∅〉〈∅|X ⊗ TrZ′A
[ NZ∑
z=1
(
|z〉〈z |Z′ ⊗
√
Zz
A
X∅A
√
Zz
A
)
σZ′AB
]}
+F
{ NX∑
x=1
|x〉〈x |X ⊗ TrA
(
ρABX
x
A
)
,
NX∑
x=1
|x〉〈x |X ⊗ TrZ′A
[ NZ∑
z=1
(
|z〉〈z |Z′ ⊗
√
Zz
A
XxA
√
Zz
A
)
σZ′AB
]}
.
(25)
Applying the data-processing inequality to the first term to trace over B:
F
{
|∅〉〈∅|X ⊗ TrA
(
ρABX
∅
A
)
, |∅〉〈∅|X ⊗ TrZ′A
[ NZ∑
z=1
(
|z〉〈z |Z′ ⊗
√
Zz
A
X∅A
√
Zz
A
)
σZ′AB
]}
≤ F(p∅XA |∅〉〈∅|X, |∅〉〈∅|X ) =
√
p∅XA .
(26)
Additionally, we can define ρX<B =
∑NX
x=1 |x〉〈x |X ⊗ TrA
(
ρABX
x
A
)/(1 − p∅XA) to be a normalized
density operator, so that:
F
{ NX∑
x=1
|x〉〈x |X ⊗ TrA
(
ρABX
x
A
)
,
NX∑
x=1
|x〉〈x |X ⊗ TrZ′A
[ NZ∑
z=1
(
|z〉〈z |Z′ ⊗
√
Zz
A
XxA
√
Zz
A
)
σZ′AB
]}
=
√
1 − p∅XAF
{
ρX<B,
NX∑
x=1
|x〉〈x |X ⊗ TrZ′A
[ NZ∑
z=1
(
|z〉〈z |Z′ ⊗
√
Zz
A
XxA
√
Zz
A
)
σZ′AB
]}
.
(27)
Finally, we know from [6] that if σ˜ ≥ σ, then F(ρ, σ˜) ≥ F(ρ, σ), so:
F
{
ρX<B,
NX∑
x=1
|x〉〈x |X ⊗ TrZ′A
[ NZ∑
z=1
(
|z〉〈z |Z′ ⊗
√
Zz
A
XxA
√
Zz
A
)
σZ′AB
]}
≤ max
(x,z),∅
| |
√
Zz
A
√
Xx
A
| |∞F
{
ρX<B, IX< ⊗ TrZ′A
[ NZ∑
z=1
(|z〉〈z |Z′)σZ′AB
]}
.
(28)
Applying this property again for σB ≥ TrZ′A[∑NZz=1(|z〉〈z |Z′)σZ′AB], we get:
max
σZ′AB
F
{
ρX<B, IX< ⊗ TrZ′A
[ NZ∑
z=1
(|z〉〈z |Z′)σZ′AB
]}
≤ max
σB
F(ρX<B, IX< ⊗ σB)
=
√
2
Hmax(X<A |B)
.
(29)
Putting together Eq. (18), and (21)-(29), we get the result in Eq. (6). 
Appendix 3: Smooth version of main result
Smooth min- and max- entropies are useful quantities for incorporating finite key size effects
[3–5, 8, 12, 14]. ε-smooth conditional min- and max-entropies are defined as:
Hεmin(A|B)ρ = max
ρ′∈Bε (ρ)
Hmin(A|B)ρ′, Hεmax(A|B)ρ = min
ρ′∈Bε (ρ)
Hmax(A|B)ρ′ (30)
where Bε(ρ) = {ρ′ | 12 | |ρ − ρ′ | |Tr ≤ ε} denotes the set of operators within an ε-distance of ρ.
Proceeding similarly to the proof from [4], wefirst note that for some τ ∈ Bε(ρ),Hεmax(X<A |B)ρ =
Hmax(X<A |B)τ . Thus, we can write down our main result, Eq. (6) for that state:
Hmin(ZA |E)τ ≥ −2 log
[√
p∅ZA(τ) +
√
p∅XA(τ) +
√
1 − p∅XA(τ)
√
c<(X, Z)
(√
2
Hεmax(X<A |B)ρ
)]
(31)
where the p∅i (τ) denote the null measurement probabilities given the state τ.
Next, we would like to express p∅i (τ) in terms of p∅i (ρ) and ε to determine how much the
probabilities from the two states can differ. Using 1 − F(ρ, τ) ≤ 12 | |ρ − τ | |Tr [3], and the
data-processing inequality [5], we find:
f−[p∅i (ρ), ε] ≤ p∅i (τ) ≤ f+[p∅i (ρ), ε] (32)
where
f±[p∅i (ρ), ε] = 2ε+p∅i (ρ)+2p∅i (ρ)ε2−4p∅i (ρ)ε−ε2±2(1−ε)
√
p∅i (ρ)ε[1 − p∅i (ρ)][2 − ε]. (33)
Finally, following [4], knowing thatHεmin(ZA |E)ρ = maxρ′∈Bε (ρ) Hmin(ZA |E)ρ′ ≥ Hmin(ZA |E)τ ,
we get the smooth version of Eq. (6):
Hεmin(ZA |E)ρ ≥ −2 log
[√
f+[p∅ZA(ρ), ε] +
√
f+[p∅XA(ρ), ε]+√
1 − f−[p∅XA(ρ), ε]
√
c<(X, Z)
(√
2
Hεmax(X<A |B)ρ
)]
.
(34)
